Rakhine’s New Frontiers of Power

Rakhine State, long a battleground of Myanmar’s contested sovereignties, is undergoing a profound geopolitical shift whose implications extend far beyond Myanmar’s borders. What had once appeared to be a frozen conflict—defined by cycles of military oppression, ethnic exclusion, and structural displacement—has entered a volatile new phase. The Arakan Army (AA), once a peripheral ethnic insurgent group, now stands on the cusp of transforming itself into a dominant regional power with political and paramilitary governance ambitions. The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), though historically ruthless in its pursuit of central authority, is increasingly losing territorial legitimacy and on-ground relevance in western Myanmar.

These developments demand urgent reassessment, particularly in Dhaka. For Bangladesh, the crisis is not merely a neighbor’s internal conflict—it is a persistent and existential challenge. With nearly one million Rohingya refugees already residing in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char, any reshuffling of power in Rakhine directly impacts the prospects of repatriation, regional security, border management, maritime stability, and diplomatic bargaining power with great-power stakeholders such as China and India.

As Rakhine transitions from state collapse to contested governance, Bangladesh faces a strategic dilemma: who is the rightful interlocutor in negotiating the safe return of displaced Rohingyas—the internationally isolated junta or a militarized nationalist movement accused of its own crimes against humanity?

Independent mappings conducted by international research organizations, including CSIS and Reuters, indicate that the AA now controls approximately 76–82 percent of Rakhine State—13 to 14 of the region’s 17 townships. This transformation amounts to a swift and staggering reversal of Myanmar’s decades-long military domination. The Tatmadaw’s latest counter-offensive—supported by certain external actors—has, at best, yielded incremental and temporary gains. A handful of towns and strategic outposts have changed hands, yet military presence does not equate to administrative authority.

Rakhine’s political landscape now represents a layered fragmentation:

• AA governmentality: parallel governance, taxation, justice systems, and local militias

• Tatmadaw enclaves: militarized remains of a collapsing centralized authority

• Lawlessness zones: smuggling routes, contested borderlands, and depopulated agricultural belts

As a result, the notion of “control” has become a fluid and contested concept. Territorial possession varies from administrative governance to sporadic troop movements, and from local legitimacy to temporary coercion. What remains consistent, however, is the absence of Rohingya security and their political erasure from the evolving order.

Land is emerging as the primary currency of power in Rakhine. Both the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army are accused of weaponizing land rights—either through violent dispossession or deceptive administrative normalization—to shape an ethnic hierarchy.

Two parallel trends define the current landscape:

• Coercive “surveys” of Rohingya villages

• Illegal land transfers favoring Rakhine Buddhist settlers

• Destruction or seizure of homes, farms, and fishing ground assets

•  Extinguishing Rohingya land claims by forced abandonment

•  Militarizing farms and settlements for tactical dominance

The outcome is disturbingly consistent: Rohingya identity is being dismantled through territorial erasure.

Testimonies from Maungdaw and Buthidaung suggest that entire communities have been declared “non-existent” by emerging AA-aligned administrative actors. Families possessing generational land records are being forcibly removed—documented ownership dismissed under discriminatory legal pretexts tied to citizenship.

Under international criminal law, such orchestrated displacement carries potential elements of:

• deportation

• persecution

• ethnic cleansing

• crimes against humanity

The winners in this new land-grab politics are future power brokers. The losers: a stateless people stripped of even the memory of home.

Bangladesh has been promised—for nearly a decade—that Rohingyas would soon be repatriated. Yet every passing year broadens the chasm between policy rhetoric and practical feasibility.

The central question today is not when Rohingyas can return, but where—and under whose authority?

Any realistic repatriation component must ensure:

• Restoration of land ownership

• Legal recognition and citizenship rights

• Security guarantees enforced by credible monitoring

• Access to livelihoods and humanitarian support

None of these prerequisites exist in current Rakhine governance—neither under the junta nor under the AA.

International organizations including Amnesty International have warned that forced return into militarized camps under AA control would constitute an “oppressive resettlement”—a euphemism for renewed persecution. Repatriation under these conditions risks replacing refugee camps in Bangladesh with open-air prisons in Rakhine.

Thus, violent stability is emerging as the new form of regional governance.

A troubling phenomenon is unfolding in international policy circles: the romanticization and normalization of the Arakan Army. Several advocacy groups and analysts have begun describing the AA using sanitized terms—“proto-state,” “de facto authority,” “local governance actor.” Such terminology carries concrete diplomatic implications: humanitarian funding pathways, political negotiations, and international recognition frameworks open in ways previously denied to insurgent groups.

But legitimacy built on narrative manipulation rather than accountability risks institutionalizing brutality.

• 175 Rohingya killed in Maungdaw in August 2025

• 600 civilians massacred in Hthan Shauk Khan, May 2024

• 200,000 internally displaced in Rakhine

• 118,000 forced to flee into Bangladesh

These figures are not historical footnotes—they are active crimes, shaping contemporary territorial politics.

To treat the AA as a credible stakeholder in humanitarian negotiations without securing commitments to justice and minority rights would be a catastrophic betrayal of global human rights norms.

While Rakhine’s local dynamics dominate headlines, the conflict is deeply embedded in geostrategic competition.

Evidence from military movement patterns and regional reporting indicates that:

•  China is backing the junta militarily to protect its BRI and Kyaukphyu port interests

•  Russia is providing weapons, air support, and military training

•  India, caught in strategic ambivalence, views both AA and Tatmadaw as risks and potential partners

The AA’s stronghold overlaps with key maritime and trade corridors. Thus, whoever controls Rakhine controls access to the Bay of Bengal—a growing theater of great-power influence.

In this geopolitical calculus, Rohingyas are secondary—territory and resources are primary.

Bangladesh’s Strategic Crossroads: A Policy of Necessity, Not Preference

Bangladesh cannot afford strategic illusions. A destabilized Rakhine means:

•  Higher refugee inflows through both land and sea

•  Threats to fishermen from AA coastal militias

•  Weapon and narcotics trafficking across maritime boundaries

•  Long-term settlement pressure on Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong infrastructures

Crucially, if the AA consolidates civilian administration, a new unrecognized but empowered political entity will materialize on Bangladesh’s doorstep. Engagement with such an actor creates risks:

• Violating international diplomatic norms

• Enabling a documented perpetrator of ethnic cleansing

• Encouraging future militancy in borderlands

Yet total disengagement carries its own perils—zero leverage over repatriation negotiations, maritime conflicts, or border incursions.

Therefore, Bangladesh must craft a strategy that:

1. Maintains humanitarian primacy for the Rohingyas

2. Exerts regional diplomatic pressure on both AA and junta leadership

3. Strengthens border and coastal deterrence capabilities

4.  Elevates repatriation as a multilateral—not bilateral—responsibility

5.  Demands international accountability against all perpetrators

Rakhine’s transformation can lead to two contrasting futures:

Both scenarios exclude the Rohingyas as political actors. Absent international intervention, Rakhine risks evolving into a regional apartheid, where geography becomes destiny and ethnicity dictates existence.

Bangladesh stands at a historic pivot point. The choices made now will determine whether Rohingyas ever return home—or remain permanently confined to limbo on Bangladeshi soil.

Three strategic imperatives are clear:

Globalizing the Rohingya Cause: The crisis must be re-elevated from bilateral negotiations with Myanmar to sustained international accountability under UN frameworks, ICJ mechanisms, and major-power diplomacy.

Conditional Engagement with Any Actor in Power: Bangladesh may engage with de facto authorities—but only on the uncompromising principles of rights, justice, and citizenship guarantees.

Establishing Maritime and Border Deterrence: Security must match diplomacy—preventing new waves of displacement and regional criminal infiltration.

Until the Rohingya are recognized as rightful citizens with protected land and livelihoods in their ancestral homeland, any talk of “stability” in Rakhine is a façade—an organized repression dressed up as governance. Bangladesh did not create this crisis. Yet, geography compels Dhaka to bear its consequences—and diplomacy obliges Dhaka to shape its resolution.

The world’s credibility on human rights will be judged by its willingness to prevent the second annihilation of a persecuted people. Rakhine’s future must not be decided by those who profit from their erasure. The Rohingyas must return home—not as outsiders to their own land, but as citizens of a state that once denied their existence.

Anything less would mark a historic failure—not only for Myanmar or Bangladesh, but for humanity’s collective conscience.